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We run a multiple linear regression model to test (1) whether filing at least one patent 
application before the first round of funding increases startups’ first-round funding amount 
and (2) whether the number of filed patent applications before the first funding round increases 
startups first-round funding amount. We apply a dataset of Swedish startups founded between 
1990-2007.   
Our findings suggest that successful patent applications increase the amount of startup funding 
in the first round. Having filed at least one patent application increases the first-round funding 
amount by 54.3% compared to their non-patenting counterparts. In addition, we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of patent applications increases the funding amount 
by 14.9%, compared to its mean. These results imply that patents reduce the information 
asymmetries between startups and investors and that investors value startups with innovative 
activity, which can have important implications for Swedish startups. Even though patents are 
suggested to reduce information asymmetries and thus increase investors’ first-round funding, 
further research is suggested to account for additional financing drivers, besides the ones 
accounted for in this study.  
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Stockholm, the Swedish capital, ranked the second highest producer of private startups worth 
more than one billion USD (“unicorns") per capita globally in 2015 (Knowledge@Wharton, 
2015). The country has fostered some of Europe’s largest technology companies, such as 
Spotify, Skype, and Klarna (McKenna, 2017). The high production of successful startups is 
still an ongoing trend in Sweden. The Swedish Institute (2021) reports that Sweden invests 
approximately 3% of its GDP in research and development. Furthermore, according to the 
European Commission, Sweden’s innovation performance exceeded the average in the 
remaining EU countries in 2020, measured above 125% (Hollanders, Es-Sadki, Merkelbach, 
& Khalilova, 2020).  
Despite the high number of successful startups, any startup faces challenges regarding liquidity 
in the early phases. Thus, they rely on external sources of funding to survive (Lee & Zhang, 
2011). Taking on debt from commercial banks in Sweden might be expensive and go on the 
expense of the entrepreneur(s) personal finance if the startup goes bankrupt 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2015). Thus, equity investments through friends and family, angel 
investors, and venture capitalists, among others, are the preferred type of startup funding 
(Corrales-Estrada, 2019).  
However, due to a lack of financial history and extensive information asymmetries, such 
funding types can be challenging to attract, especially in early stages (Damodaran, 2009). 
Within the entrepreneurial finance literature, many researchers have found that patents serve 
a signaling effect and can reduce information asymmetries and provide startups with economic 
benefits and legal protection. Patents have proven effective in terms of increased perceptions 
of startup value from venture capitalists, especially in early stages (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008, 
2013). Further, the intellectual property (IP) right contribute positively in attracting venture 
capital funding and significantly increased investment amounts from venture capitalists (Baum 
& Silverman, 2004; Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2009; Conti, Thursby, & Rothaermel, 2013; 
Hoenen, Kolympiris, Schoenmakers, & Kalaitzandonakes, 2014; Mann & Sager, 2007; Zhou, 
Sandner, Martinelli, & Block, 2016) 
However, research on patents’ effect on other types of startup funding is somewhat scarce. 
Some researchers have examined the effect of patents on angel investments with mixed results 
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(Conti et al., 2013; Graham, Merges, Samuelson, & Sichelman, 2009; Sudek, 2007), while the 
remaining types of startup funding have, until now, remained left in the dark.  
To our knowledge, no study has been conducted on the relationship between patents and the 
amount of startup funding raised across funding types. The primary motivation of this thesis 
is to contribute to this existing gap in the entrepreneurial finance literature. In line with 
previous research on venture capital funding, we argue that patents should positively impact 
the amount of startup funding across funding types as well, as the IP-right can serve a signaling 
purpose and reduce information asymmetries between startups and investors. Additionally, we 
have not seen any study that addresses the impact of patents on startup funding in either of the 
Nordic countries in isolation. Motivated by this fact, the unicorn factory Sweden is an exciting 
starting point since their innovation performance is high, as explained above.  
Thus, based on the existing gap, and the non-existing literature, we formulate our main 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Patenting activity, as measured through at least one filed patent application, 
positively affects the amount of first-round funding for Swedish startups. 
Additionally, to examine whether the number of applications affects the amount of startup 
funding raised, we articulate a second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The number of filed patent applications positively affects the amount of first-
round funding for Swedish startups. 
In our opinion, there are at least two reasons why we should expect a positive effect of 
patenting activity on the amount of first-round startup funding. First, patent applications may 
help the startup in securing future financing, as they serve a signaling purpose that reduces 
information asymmetries. Second, in the first funding round for startups with patenting 
activities, the dollar amount of funds raised should be more generous, as patents can reflect 
startup qualities that are necessary for startup survival.  
We test our hypotheses applying a dataset of 132 Swedish startups founded between 1990-
2007, retrieved from Crunchbase. The startups in our sample received their first-round funding 
during the period 2000-2019. We manually collect data on filed patent applications between 
1990-2020 from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  
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After running a multiple linear regression model, controlling for financing drivers, our results 
suggest that filing a patent application before the first round of financing increases the amount 
of first-round startup funding by 54.3% across funding types. Further, a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of filed patent applications before first-round funding leads to a 14.9% 
increase in funding amount, compared to its mean.  
Our results suggest that patents work as an effective signal that reduces information 
asymmetries and reflects startup quality which seems to be valued by investors. Thus, the 
implications of our results suggest that patenting activity comes with additional economic 
benefits in the first round of funding across startup funding types in Sweden. Swedish 
entrepreneurs can maintain the probability of startup survival by applying for patents and thus 
secure equity investments, avoiding taking on expensive debt. Further, our results suggest that 
investors value high innovative activity and thus provide more considerable amounts of startup 
funding when the startup files more patent applications. 
Our thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents previous research on the topic. In section 
3, we present our data collection. Following, section 4 explains the methodology and variables 
used in our models. In section 5, we provide an empirical analysis and results. Section 6 
provides a discussion and the implications of our results. Section 7 touches upon potential 
limitations and provides suggestions for further research. Finally, we conclude the thesis in 




2. Literature Review 
This section provides insight into previous research on the impact of patents on startup 
funding. The literature review is divided into two sections. First, we explain the problems with 
information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors. Subsequently, we turn to signal 
theory as a solution to the problem of asymmetric information. We explain the basic concept 
and dive into research done on patents’ effect on startup funding.  
2.1 Asymmetric Information 
Information asymmetries are a common problem that results from one party in a transaction 
having more and better information than the other party. Asymmetric information is one of 
the major problems concerning uncertainties regarding quality. The concept applies to several 
actors in different markets (Akerlof, 1970), including the relationship between investors and 
entrepreneurs seeking external capital.  
Attracting financing is crucial for the startup during the early stages to further develop and 
ultimately survive. When seeking external financing, it can be difficult and expensive to raise 
capital from traditional sources such as commercial banks. The reason is that startups are 
characterized by high uncertainty and are constrained regarding financial resources. Therefore, 
startups must turn to other sources of external capital to obtain a chance to survive (Lee & 
Zhang, 2011).  
Private equity sources such as friends, family, angels, and venture capitalists can offer startups 
the capital they need. However, the relationship between entrepreneurs and investors is 
characterized by information asymmetries since startups typically suffer from negative cash 
flows. Its performance and prospects are thus challenging to assess for any outsiders 
(Damodaran, 2009; Haeussler, Harhoff, & Mueller, 2014). Thus, the startup needs to reduce 
the information asymmetry by efficiently communicating its quality to potential investors.  
2.2 Signal Effects 
Entrepreneurs can reduce information asymmetries through signaling, which, in the literature, 
is viewed as an effective mechanism of communication.  
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According to Spence (1973), a signal is one or more visible attributes that act as pointers of 
one or more adjustable but unobservable characteristics of a signaler. For a signal to be 
efficient, it should be costly to obtain for the signaler. Further, it should be of low cost for the 
receiver to obtain the signal, and it shall enable the receiver to distinguish between quality 
types (Long, 2002). Going forward, we will refer to the startup as the signaler and a new 
investor the receiver of the signal, in line with previous research on signaling within the 
entrepreneurial finance literature (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). Previous work 
has applied Spence’s theory in the context of patents as an effective signal to attract investors.  
Long (2002) argues that patents can serve as a signal. Even though patents come with the 
benefit of the right to exclude competitors and thus legal protection, less visible characteristics 
of a startup, such as firm or innovation productivity or other types of knowledge capital, can 
also be revealed through patents. If investors recognize that patents can serve such a purpose, 
the IP-right can assist startups in conveying information that is not easy to identify for 
investors. We argue, in line with the literature, that patents fulfill the criteria that form a signal. 
First, for potential investors, the cost of obtaining the information from a patent is relatively 
low, as they are publicly available sometime after the filing date. Second, patents are costly to 
obtain for the startup in filing fees and application processing time, meaning only startups with 
high-quality inventions will be willing to apply. Finally, patents can be associated with 
characteristics of a startup that can be challenging to identify and that is valuable to investors 
(Long, 2002).  
The literature on patents as a signaling mechanism for startup funding has mostly focused on 
venture capital funding. Some but little attention has been dedicated to other types of startup 
funding. One reason might be that it previously has been difficult to get credible data on 
specific deals from private investors, as some prefer to stay anonymous (Van Osnabrugge & 
Robinson, 2000).  
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey (2009) suggest that the motivation of a technology 
startup to apply for patents is varied. Among them is the incentive to achieve the startup’s 
financial goals. The study surveyed 1,332 young US-based companies. The respondents’ 
perception was that patents contribute to the decision of funding across several startup funding 
types, such as angel investors, friends, family, venture capitalists, commercial banks, and 
investment banks (Graham et al., 2009). The authors have further conducted interviews on a 
sample of the entrepreneurs enrolled in the survey, which is advantageous. From the 
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entrepreneurs, they got first-hand information, providing an accurate picture of the perception 
of patents’ effect on attracting funding. However, to our understanding, the authors did not 
consult any of the funding sources directly concerning the importance of patents in the 
investment decision. Thus, there might exist some alternative explanation, besides patents, 
that serves as investor’s determination standard.  
Also, research that has been dedicated to the investment decision criteria of an investor has 
mainly focused on the selection criteria of venture capitalists. However, in a mixed study of 
angel investors, Sudek (2007) report that IP rights, such as patents, were infrequently 
mentioned as a selection criterion during interviews with 72 members from the Tech Coast 
Angels. This finding suggests that for angel investors, patents as a selection criterion to invest 
in a startup varies across investors. The results, however, highlighted the entrepreneur’s 
passion, trustworthiness, the appropriability of the management team, and exit strategy as 
criteria for investing (Sudek, 2007). The findings, therefore, contradict what was uncovered 
by Graham et al. (2009).  
Conti et al. (2013) introduces a simple model suggesting that startups should invest in the 
signal their targeted investor value the most. The authors empirically test the model using a 
sample of high technology companies from the Advanced Technology Development Center 
in Georgia. They test the effect of technological quality signaling through patents and founder 
commitment signaling through investments of friends, family, and founder (FFF) funds on 
venture capitalist and business angel funding, respectively. The results suggest that venture 
capitalists and business angels value different signals when facing an investment decision. 
They find that “a 1% increase in the number of patents filed increases the likelihood of venture 
capital financing by 46%, while a 1% increase in FFF money increases the likelihood of 
business angel financing by 5%” (Conti et al., 2013, p. 343). The research, therefore, 
contradicts the reported perceptions on the importance of patents in the investment decision 
as explained by Graham et al. (2009) and is consistent with the findings of Sudek (2007). 
A vast majority of research is dedicated to patents’ effect on venture capital funding, regarding 
the probability of receiving funding, investor’s valuation estimates of startups, and the funding 
amount raised. These studies have mainly focused on industries where patenting activity is 
shown to be relatively high (Nadeau, 2010). For example, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2009) 
and Mann and Sager (2007) investigates patenting activity in the software industry. For 
startups in the this industry, venture capital funding increased by 15% for one additional patent 
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application (Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2009). Additionally, software startups that engaged in 
patenting activity received approximately 10.7M USD more in venture capital funding 
compared to non-patenting startups (Mann & Sager, 2007). For patenting startups in the 
biotechnology industry in Canada, patent applications are shown to lead to significantly more 
venture capital funding (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Hsu and Ziedonis (2008, 2013) investigate 
whether patents assist startups in the semiconductor industry in the United States (US) in 
attracting venture capital funding. They find that patents increase startup valuation estimates 
by 28% for a doubling in the number of filed patent applications, and that valuation estimates 
seem to be higher in the early stages (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008, 2013) .  
All the studies mentioned above find a positive relationship between patenting activity on 
venture capital funding, with various results regarding the size of the economic impact. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that startups in industries with high levels of patenting 
activity have higher innovation productivity, which might be considered a valuable 
characteristic by investors, however, difficult to observe. High innovation productivity can be 
reflected through multiple patent applications and thus constitute effective signals. Thus, one 
can argue that a positive effect on funding is expected. 
An interesting finding when examining 580 US-based biotechnology startups, Hoenen et al. 
(2014) reveals that patenting activities before the first round of funding increase the amount 
raised from venture capitalists for each additional patent compared to patenting activities 
before the second round of financing. The economic size equaled an increase of 7.7% first-
round funding for each additional application. In other words, startups receive more in first-
round funding than what is provided in the second round if the startup files for at least one 
patent application. Their findings suggest that patents have a higher value during the first 
round of venture capital funding when information asymmetries are high. That is, a patent 
application loses value between the first and the second round of venture capital financing as 
the investor gets more familiar with the startup (Hoenen et al., 2014).  
A limited number of studies have also investigated the signaling effect of patents on venture 
capital funding across sectors. Zhou et al. (2016) examined whether patents and trademarks 
together served an even more substantial signaling effect than each IP right alone. The authors 
uncovered that for the technology startups in their sample, patents and trademarks are more 
efficient in attracting venture capital funding when combined, rather than each IP-right alone. 
However, they also found that applying only for at least one patent before turning to venture 
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capitalists for capital increased the funding amount by 51.7%. This significant effect is 
consistent with Hoenen et al. (2014) finding that patent applications before the first round of 
funding attracts higher amounts of venture capital funding and strengthen the suggestion that 
patents assist startups in reducing information asymmetries when these are severe, in line with 
previous literature.  
Caviggioli, Colombelli, De Marco, and Paolucci (2020) conducted an extensive study on 1,096 
young innovative companies in Europe. They broke the signaling effect of patents into 
measures of complexity, portfolio size, and quality. They examined whether any of these 
characteristics had a positive effect on venture capital funding across sectors, in specific 
industries, and during different stages of funding. The results suggest that the number of filed 
patent applications and quality measures attracts higher amounts of venture capital funding 
across sectors. When comparing sectors with different levels of IP intensity, the results suggest 
that patenting activity is more valuable for attracting funding in industries with high IP 
intensity. Finally, the authors uncover that more patent applications during early financing 
rounds are not significant on the amount raised  (Caviggioli et al., 2020). This latter finding 
contradicts the findings of Hoenen et al. (2014) and Zhou et al. (2016), explained above. 
Nevertheless, a weakness of the study is that the authors apply a sample of only the largest 
venture-backed deals listed in VCStar. In our opinion, this might create a skewed image of 
what reality looks like in Europe, as the characteristics discussed in the paper might not apply 
to all sizes of funding.  
Our thesis differentiates from the studies mentioned above in several aspects. First, we have 
restricted our research objective to Sweden. To our knowledge, no studies on the economic 
impact of patenting activities on startup funding have been done in either of the Nordic 
countries in isolation. We argue that Sweden is a good point of departure as the country has 
favorable policies for young companies (Løhre, 2015). Second, a large portion of the research 
has focused on venture capital funding. Such funding is challenging to attract for startups due 
to their reliance on due diligence and involvement of the venture capitalists in the startup’s 
operations through monitoring (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Even though the emphasis on 
venture capital funding is reasonable, we account for other funding types as well.  
Further, information asymmetries are shown to be more severe during the early stages of 
financing.  We focus our thesis on whether patents attract more startup funding in the first 
round of financing across funding types and industries. Since Sweden generates many startups, 
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investors need to find ways to distinguish the high-quality ones from the lower quality ones 
without excessive effort, and patents are suggested to serve such a purpose. Even though angel 
investors do not consider patents an investment decision criterion, as explained above, we still 
want to test whether this holds for Swedish startups as well. In addition, before investigating 
specific types of funding or industries, the chapter on the overall effect of patents on the 
amount of startup funding has to be opened in Sweden. Finally, we differentiate from previous 
research in that we apply a dataset from Crunchbase. The database is barely used in studies 
like those mentioned, as most researchers apply data from more famous sources, such as 
VentureXpert.  
As a final remark, Farre-Mensa, Hegde, and Ljungqvist (2020) found that being a first-time 
applicant who “wins” what they refer to as the “patent lottery” increases the probability of 
receiving funding from certain investors, which is in line with recognizing patents as a signal. 
However, the paper suggests that examiners at the patent office suffer from cognitive biases. 
Some examiners are lenient, while others are not, and whether one receives a patent grant 
depends on the examiner’s leniency (Farre-Mensa et al., 2020). These cognitive limitations at 
the patent office are outside the scope of this thesis and limit our research. 
In summary, signaling through patents resolves the issues of asymmetric information between 
entrepreneurs and investors. Regarding venture capital funding, a startup’s patenting activity 
has been shown to work as a signal in increasing the likelihood of attracting financing, startup 
valuation estimates, and the amount raised. However, the literature on patents’ attractiveness 
across types of startup funding is scarce. Thus, to our knowledge, by studying whether 
patenting activities attract higher amounts of startup capital across funding types in Sweden in 
isolation, our thesis contributes to an existing gap in the entrepreneurial finance literature.  
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3. Data 
This section presents our data collection process. First, we elaborate on the collection of the 
startup data. Subsequently, we describe the collection process of the patent dataset. Further, 
we explain how we matched the data. Finally, we introduce Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
to construct our final sample, which will be used for further analysis.  
3.1 Startup Data 
To collect a sample of Swedish startups, we have assembled data from Crunchbase. 
Crunchbase is a website that provides firm and funding-specific information. The platform 
allows members to retrieve data on startup companies, investors, transactions, among others, 
listed in the database (Crunchbase Inc, n.d.-a).  
Table 1: Summary of the steps in the sample collection process 
Steps Sample selection process Startups 
1 For-profit Swedish startups founded between 1990 and 2007 3,749 
2 Remove startups with missing data on the total funding amount 351 
3 Remove startups with missing data on the first funding round 323 
4 Remove startups with post-IPO or unknown funding rounds  302 
5 Remove startups with more than 400 employees 293 
 
We have gathered information on for-profit startups with headquarters in Sweden founded 
between 19901 and 2007. To avoid the possible damaging effects of the 2008 financial crisis, 
we start our data collection with startups founded in 2007 and work our way back. The entire 
and raw dataset includes 3,749 Swedish startups. 
We remove startups that have received funding after the Initial Public Offering (IPO). The 
reason is that we want to study startups before their IPO. We also remove startups with more 
than 400 employees. It is challenging to set a clear cut on the number of employees a firm can 
have before ceasing to be considered a startup. Crunchbase does not provide the number of 
employees working at a startup at the time of each funding round, and we thereby assume this 
number to be accumulated. However, for the startups that received their first-round funding 
 
1 The explanation for why we stop at 1990 is provided in section 3.2. 
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several years ago, we expect the number of employees to be well below what Crunchbase 
reports at the time of that funding round. Zhou et al. (2016) examine startups with less than 
100 employees in their study. In our opinion, 100 is too low considering that we deal with 
accumulated numbers, and we choose to exclude startups with more than 400 employees 
instead. After completing our sample collection process summarized in Table 1, we are left 
with 293 startups with complete data on the amount of funding raised in the first round.  
3.2 Patent Data 
We use Google Patents2 to retrieve data on granted patent applications (Google, n.d.). When 
searching Crunchbase for startups, we start in 2007 and collect all startups founded that year. 
Simultaneously, we manually search the startups with complete funding data founded in 2007 
in Google Patents to see how many have filed a patent application. For each year, we continue 
this process, working our way backward. We stop at 1990 as approximately one-third of the 
293 startups filed and were granted a patent through the USPTO during 1990-2020, which we 
consider a sufficiently large portion to conduct our study. In total, the startups in our sample 
filed and were granted 524 patent applications during the respective period. 
Even though we limit our thesis to patent applications, we collect data on granted patents to 
ensure the application date is published.3  
3.3 Matching Startup and Patent Data 
Employing software, we match the patent data with the Crunchbase sample on the name of the 
startup. Crunchbase does not report the company’s full legal name for some startups; e.g., the 
Swedish term “AB” is sometimes missing. Therefore, before matching, we remove such 
abbreviations and hence increase our matching opportunities. The matching procedure leaves 
us with 85 startups that filed and were granted at least one patent in 1990-2020.  
 
2 We choose to use Google Patents to collect data on granted patent applications as this database is convenient to use. 
3 Before 29 November, 2000 the USPTO did not publish patent applications that were not granted (Marco, Carley, Jackson, 
& Myers, 2015). 
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3.4 Propensity Score Matching 
At this point, we can divide our sample into two groups: those who have filed a patent 
application and those who have not. We must bear in mind that there might be several 
characteristics other than the patent application that distinguishes the two groups. Ideally, we 
want the patenting startups to have the same characteristics as the non-patenting startups. The 
only difference between the groups should be whether or not they have filed a patent. That is, 
for each patenting startup, we want a non-patenting startup to be as similar as possible on all 
observable characteristics. In order to do this, we apply PSM (Austin, 2011), which is 
described in detail in the section below. 
3.4.1 Treatment and Control Group 
We refer to the patenting startups as the treatment group. For each startup in the treatment 
group, we want to select one non-patenting startup. These non-patenting startups will 
eventually form our control group. We want each pair to be as identical as possible. However, 
it is practically impossible to find completely identical startups where one has filed a patent 
application while the twin has not (Austin, 2011). Thus, we make the best possible match 
based on all available information and reduce selection bias by applying PSM.  
PSM was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and the authors defined it as “the 
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed 
covariates” (p. 41). The propensity score for treatment is denoted  	
 𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑟	(𝑧 = 1│𝑥) (1) 
Where z = 1 indicates treatment, and x is the observed covariates. E(x) is the probability of 
being treated (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). When applying the propensity score for matching 
purposes, the procedure employs the covariates representing observable pre-treatment 
characteristics and tries to find comparable control objects to the treated based on these 
characteristics (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
In order to estimate the propensity score for each startup, we run a logistic regression model 
(Austin, 2011). In logistic regression, the dependent variable can take one of two values, in 
our case indicating 1 if the startup has filed a patent application before the first funding round 
and 0 otherwise. The treatment group in our case consists of 66 startups, i.e., out of the 85 
startups that had ever filed a patent application, 66 of these did so before the first funding 
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round. The independent variables are the covariates representing pre-treatment characteristics 
(Guido, Winters, & Rains, 2006). The covariates implemented in our model are the industry 
the startup operates in, the startup’s foundation year, and whether or not the startup is located 
in Stockholm. All these covariates are dummy variables.  
We choose industry as one of the covariates because we believe some industries are more 
likely to file a patent application than others. Further, by including the foundation year, the 
treatment and control startups are assumed to have had the same point of departure for success 
or failure. When founded approximately the same year, they are expected to follow the same 
policies and operate in the same economic surroundings. Regarding the location of the 
matched startups, we argue that startups located in Stockholm are more likely to benefit from 
the same positive spillover effects than startups located elsewhere, in the early stages 
(Almeida, Dokko, & Rosenkopf, 2003). Such spill-over effects can be sharing of knowledge 
or learning from successful startups located in the area.  
We apply the nearest neighbor method to match treated startups with untreated startups. We 
specify the model to start with the treated startups with the highest propensity score and then 
find an untreated startup with the closest propensity score to the treated one. In addition, we 
use 1:1 matching, i.e., for each treated startup, only one untreated startup is selected as a 
control unit. Further, we specify the model to match without replacement of the untreated 
startups. Without replacement means that each untreated startup can only be paired once to a 
treated subject. The untreated startups that have been matched form our control group (Austin, 
2011). The PSM leaves us with 66 control startups, 132 startups in total.  
Table 2 presents the covariate balance between the treated and the untreated group before 
applying PSM. Columns 3 and 4 show the occurrence of untreated and treated units for each 
level of the dummy variables, and occurrence in percentage terms is included in parenthesis.  
There are significant differences between the two groups for the covariates Capital and 
Industry, which we can tell from the resulting low p-values4.  Though p-values have to be used 
with caution in these types of analysis since a higher p-value after matching can be a result of 
the decreased sample size. Another method to measure covariate balance between the two 
 
4 The p-values are obtained by a chi-square test (Howarter, 2015). 
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groups, commonly used in PSM analysis, is by calculating the standardized mean difference 
(SMD)5 for each covariate (Howarter, 2015). According to Austin (2011), an SMD value of 
less than 0.1 indicates covariate balance between the two groups for a particular covariate. As 
can be seen from Table 2, the SMD exceeds the threshold of 0.1 for all covariates. Therefore, 
we can conclude there exist covariate imbalance between the two groups before performing 
our matching procedure. 
Table 2: Covariate balance between the untreated and treated group before 
PSM 
 Level Untreated Treated p-value SMD 
Number of observations  227 66   
Capital (%) No 129 (56.8) 54 (81.8) <0.001 0.563 
 Yes 98 (43.2) 12 (18.2)   
Industry (%) Administrative Services 3 (1.3) 1 (1.5) 0.001 1.335 
 Advertising 7 (3.1) 1 (1.5)   
 Agriculture and Farming 0 (0.0) 2 (3.0)   
 Apps 6 (2.6) 0 (0.0)   
 Artificial Intelligence 5 (2.2) 0 (0.0)   
 Biotechnology 18 (7.9) 22 (33.3)   
 Clothing and Apparel 3 (1.3) 0 (0.0)   
 Commerce and Shopping 17 (7.5) 0 (0.0)   
 Community and Lifestyle 2 (0.9) 1 (1.5)   
 Consumer Electronics 19 (8.4) 6 (9.1)   
 Consumer Goods 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
 Content and Publishing 9 (4.0) 0 (0.0)   
 Data and Analytics 10 (4.4) 2 (3.0)   
 Design 4 (1.8) 1 (1.5)   
 Education 3 (1.3) 0 (0.0)   
 Energy 7 (3.1) 5 (7.6)   
 Financial Services 6 (2.6) 1 (1.5)   
 Food and Beverage 4 (1.8) 0 (0.0)   
 Gaming 5 (2.2) 0 (0.0)   
 Hardware 18 (7.9) 10 (15.2)   
 Health Care 11 (4.8) 4 (6.1)   
 Information Technology 26 (11.5) 3 (4.5)   
 Internet Services 4 (1.8) 0 (0.0)   
 Manufacturing 13 (5.7) 3 (4.5)   
 Media and Entertainment 6 (2.6) 0 (0.0)   
 
5 The formula to calculate SMD is provided in Appendix B. 
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 Mobile 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
 Other 5 (2.2) 2 (3.0)   
 Professional Services 4 (1.8) 1 (1.5)   
 Sales and Marketing 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
 Science and Engineering 0 (0.0) 1 (1.5)   
 Software 6 (2.6) 0 (0.0)   
 Sports 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
 Sustainability 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
 Transportation 1 (0.4) 0 (0.0)   
Founded Year (%) 1990 2 (0.9) 0 (0.0) 0.513 0.591 
 1991 4 (1.8) 1 (1.5)   
 1992 5 (2.2) 0 (0.0)   
 1993 2 (0.9) 0 (0.0)   
 1994 3 (1.3) 1 (1.5)   
 1995 1 (0.4) 2 (3.0)   
 1996 4 (1.8) 1 (1.5)   
 1997 5 (2.2) 0 (0.0)   
 1998 9 (4.0) 6 (9.1)   
 1999 12 (5.3) 5 (7.6)   
 2000 17 (7.5) 9 (13.6)   
 2001 19 (8.4) 8 (12.1)   
 2002 12 (5.3) 3 (4.5)   
 2003 23 (10.1) 3 (4.5)   
 2004 24 (10.6) 5 (7.6)   
 2005 25 (11.0) 6 (9.1)   
 2006 32 (14.1) 8 (12.1)   
 2007 28 (12.3) 8 (12.1)   
 
Table 3 reports the covariate distribution between the two groups after applying PSM. As 
mentioned previously, the untreated startup that is matched to a treated startup is denoted as a 
control unit. As can be seen from Table 3, all covariates have a lower SMD than before PSM. 
However, none of the covariates have an SMD below the 0.1 threshold, i.e., there is still 
covariate imbalance between the two groups. Even though we have not achieved full balance 
among our covariates, the SMD value has been reduced to a great extent for the covariates 
Capital and Industry. We observe that the SMD value for the Capital covariate is fairly close 
to fulfilling the criteria for balance.  
Our somewhat poor matching results might be due to our small sample size. With small 
samples, it gets more challenging to find an optimal match (Zhao et al., 2021). We 
acknowledge that the matching procedure has not given us a perfect result, but we have 
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managed to reduce the difference between the two groups. Ideally, we would include more 
covariates in our model, but we try to perform the best possible matching with the available 
information at our hand. Thus, we proceed with the matched sample for further analysis. 
Table 3: Covariate balance between treatment and control group after PSM 
 Level Control Treated p-value SMD 
Number of observations  66 66   
Capital (%) No 51 (77.3) 54 (81.8) 0.666 0.113 
 Yes 15 (22.7) 12 (18.2)   
Industry (%) Administrative Services 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5) 0.965 0.487 
 Advertising 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 Agriculture and Farming 0 (0.0) 2 (3.0)   
 Biotechnology 18 (27.3) 22 (33.3)   
 Community and Lifestyle 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 Consumer Electronics 10 (15.2) 6 (9.1)   
 Data and Analytics 3 (4.5) 2 (3.0)   
 Design 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 Energy 5 (7.6) 5 (7.6)   
 Financial Services 0 (0.0) 1 (1.5)   
 Hardware 14 (21.2) 10 (15.2)   
 Health Care 5 (7.6) 4 (6.1)   
 Information Technology 1 (1.5) 3 (4.5)   
 Manufacturing 3 (4.5) 3 (4.5)   
 Other 2 (3.0) 2 (3.0)   
 Professional Services 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 Science and Engineering 0 (0.0) 1 (1.5)   
Founded Year (%) 1991 3 (4.5) 1 (1.5) 0.938 0.445 
 1994 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 1995 0 (0.0) 2 (3.0)   
 1996 1 (1.5) 1 (1.5)   
 1998 4 (6.1) 6 (9.1)   
 1999 5 (7.6) 5 (7.6)   
 2000 9 (13.6) 9 (13.6)   
 2001 6 (9.1) 8 (12.1)   
 2002 6 (9.1) 3 (4.5)   
 2003 1 (1.5) 3 (4.5)   
 2004 5 (7.6) 5 (7.6)   
 2005 5 (7.6) 6 (9.1)   
 2006 10 (15.2) 8 (12.1)   
 2007 10 (15.2) 8 (12.1)   
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3.4.2 Final Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on data about the first funding round for each startup. Thus, 
we filter the data to contain the first funding round for each startup in the sample, leaving us 
with 132 funding rounds. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of our final sample. 
Explanations of the variables presented in the table are provided in section 4.2. 
From Table 4, we can see that the average first-round funding amount for the matched sample 
is 5.976 million USD. We observe that there is a large gap between the minimum and 
maximum values for this variable. The average time from foundation to first-round funding, 
which can be read from the FirmAge variable, is approximately 9 years. The standard deviation 
for this variable is 6.177 years, i.e., there is a good spread. Of course, we do not know the 
exact reasons why it takes more time for some startups than others to raise money, but we can 
assume on a general basis that it is difficult for startups in the first place to receive startup 
funding.  
Further, from Table 4, we see that the highest number of filed patent applications before the 
first funding round is 13. Additionally, the most common funding type in the first funding 
round is VC6. About 75% of our sample received this funding type. Further, the most 
represented industry is biotechnology, where 22 out of 40 startups in the biotechnology 
industry come from the treatment group. This is not surprising as patents serve an important 
role for startups in the biotechnology industry (Raidt, n.d.). Next, we observe a decent spread 
in which years the transactions took place, and most first-round transactions in our sample 
occurred in 2017.  
Regarding the foundation year of the startups, there is an increasing number of founded 
startups throughout the years in our dataset, which might be due to improvements in data 
availability from Crunchbase in later years. Another observation is that there were no founded 
startups in our sample in 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1997. Again, one reason might be poor data 
availability during the early years, but also because of our small sample size.  
 
6 We have grouped the following funding types into the venture capital (VC) category: Seed, Series A-G, and Venture – 
Series Unknown. These funding types are provided by Crunchbase (Crunchbase Inc, n.d.-b). An explanation of the pooled 
category can be found in Appendix A. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of sample after matching 
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max 
Funding 132 5.976 10.224 2.144 0.046 61.466 
NumEmployees 132 39.030 61.684 31 1 376 
NumInvestors 132 1.553 0.952 1 1 5 
FirmAge7 132 9.110 6.177 8.050 0.000 26.200 
Capital (dummy) 132 0.205   0 1 
PatentApp (dummy) 132 0.500   0 1 
NumPatentApp 132 1.174 1.880 0.5 0 13 
 
Funding Type (dummies)       
   VC 98 0.742   0 1 
   Angel 1 0.008   0 1 
   Corporate Round 1 0.008   0 1 
   Grant 29 0.22   0 1 
   Private Equity 3 0.023   0 1 
       
Industry (dummies)       
   Biotechnology 40 0.303   0 1 
   Administrative Services 2 0.015   0 1 
   Advertising 2 0.015   0 1 
   Agriculture and Farming 2 0.015   0 1 
   Community and Lifestyle 2 0.015   0 1 
   Consumer Electronics 16 0.121   0 1 
   Data and Analytics 5 0.038   0 1 
   Design 2 0.015   0 1 
   Energy 10 0.076   0 1 
   Financial Services 1 0.008   0 1 
   Hardware 24 0.182   0 1 
   Health Care 9 0.068   0 1 
   Information Technology 4 0.03   0 1 
   Manufacturing 6 0.045   0 1 
   Other 4 0.03   0 1 
   Professional Services 2 0.015   0 1 
   Science and Engineering 1 0.008   0 1 
       
Investment Year (dummies)       
   2000 4 0.03   0 1 
   2001 3 0.023   0 1 
 
7 We are aware that some startups might be too old to be considered a startup, which might provide us with a limitation. A 
further discussion is provided in section 7.1. 
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   2002 1 0.008   0 1 
   2003 6 0.045   0 1 
   2004 1 0.008   0 1 
   2005 10 0.076   0 1 
   2006 12 0.091   0 1 
   2007 8 0.061   0 1 
   2008 10 0.076   0 1 
   2009 3 0.023   0 1 
   2010 9 0.068   0 1 
   2011 4 0.03   0 1 
   2012 1 0.008   0 1 
   2013 6 0.045   0 1 
   2014 6 0.045   0 1 
   2015 11 0.083   0 1 
   2016 11 0.083   0 1 
   2017 13 0.098   0 1 
   2018 4 0.03   0 1 
   2019 9 0.068   0 1 
       
Founded Year       
   1991 4 0.03     
   1994 2 0.015     
   1995 2 0.015     
   1996 2 0.015     
   1998 10 0.076     
   1999 10 0.076     
   2000 18 0.136     
   2001 14 0.106     
   2002 9 0.068     
   2003 4 0.03     
   2004 10 0.076     
   2005 11 0.083     
   2006 18 0.136     
   2007 18 0.136     
 
 25 
4. Methodology and Variable Description 
4.1 Methodology 
To test whether the amount of startup funding is affected by a patent application for startups 
in Sweden before the first round, we run a simple and a multiple linear regression model.8 The 
general notation of the multiple regression model is as follows:  
 𝑦 = 	𝛽! + 𝛽"𝑥" + 𝛽#𝑥# +	𝛽$𝑥$ +⋯+	𝛽%𝑥% + 𝑢	 (2) 
Where y is the dependent variable and xi are the independent variables. Since several factors 
can affect the amount of funding a startup receives, other than patents, the model allows us to 
control for those. The forthcoming sections describe our implemented variables. An 
elaboration on the assumptions of the model is provided in Appendix C.  
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, ln(Funding), is the natural logarithm of the first-round funding 
amount in million USD. We apply the natural logarithm to correct for highly skewed funding 
amounts and normalize the variable (Wooldridge, 2020). In addition, since our data consists 
of funding amounts across time, we adjust for inflation. Using inflation data for Sweden 
provided by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2021), we adjust all funding amounts into 
2010-dollars9. The adjustment enables us to make an apple-to-apple comparison of monetary 
values across time.  
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables are PatentApp and NumPatentApp. The variable PatentApp 
is a dummy variable indicating 1 if the startup filed at least one patent application before the 
 
8 We only provide an explanation of the multiple linear regression model, as the simple regression model is similar, but only 
includes one independent variable. 
9 We adjust all funding amounts into 2010-dollars as 2010 is approximately the investment year in the middle of our sample.  
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first round of funding and 0 otherwise. The variable NumPatentApp is the number of filed 
patent applications by a startup before the first funding round. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Several factors can affect the amount of first-round funding a startup receives other than filed 
patent applications. We control for such factors by including several control variables in our 
regression models. Due to unavailable data on some variables for some observations, we make 
a few assumptions described below. We implement several control variables as in the study of  
Zhou et al. (2016).  
We create the variable FirmAge, which measures the time from the foundation date of a startup 
to the first funding round. There might be differences in the funding amount raised among 
startups affected by the age of the startup. Including this control variable enables us to hold 
the age of a startup in our regression models fixed.  
The NumInvestors variable indicates how many investors participated in the first funding 
round. This variable controls for the effect of multiple investors who take part in the first 
funding round. For some of the startups in our sample, there is missing information on this 
variable. We assume that there has to be at least one investor participating in the funding 
round; thus, we replace the missing values by 1.  
The variable ln(NumEmployees) is the natural logarithm of employees working at the startup, 
a firm size measure. When retrieved from Crunchbase, the information on the number of 
employees is not complete. We assume that at least the founder is working at the startup, and 
thus for missing values, we set the number of employees equal to 1. Further, Crunchbase 
provides the number of employees as an interval, e.g., 11-50. We select the median value as 
the number of employees for each respective interval for each startup. We apply the natural 
logarithm since the data is quite spread out, with 1 as the minimum and 376 as the maximum 
number of employees in our sample.  
Since there is a large spread in the timing of funding rounds, namely 20 years, we control for 
macro-economic events by including investment year dummies. In addition, since it is 
reasonable to believe that different industries receive different amounts of funding, and Zhou 
et al. (2016) finds that differences in funding amounts across industries are significant, we 
have included industry dummies. Lastly, considering that different types of investors typically 
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provide different amounts of funding, and our sample consists of various funding types, we 
include funding type dummies.  
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5. Empirical Analysis and Results 
In Table 5, we present the results of whether filing at least one patent application positively 
affects the first-round funding amount a startup receives, i.e., we test Hypothesis 1. The 
regressions are performed on the first funding round for the 132 matched startups. The primary 
independent variable of interest is the dummy variable PatentApp.  
Model 1 in Table 5 is our baseline model and estimates the treatment effect. In this model, we 
only include the PatentApp dummy as our independent variable. From our result, we see that 
the effect of filing at least one patent application before first-round funding is positively 
associated with the amount of funding raised. However, the result is not statistically 
significant. As noted previously, we did not achieve full balance on the covariates from the 
PSM analysis, and this has most likely made an impact on the estimated treatment effect 
(Greifer, 2020).  
Model 2, in Table 5, includes all control variables described in section 4.1. The PatentApp 
dummy has a positive effect on the first-round funding amount and is significant at the 10% 
level, supporting Hypothesis 1. Startups that have filed at least one patent application before 
the first funding round receive 54.3%10 more in first-round funding than those who have not 
filed a patent application, holding other factors fixed. The result implies that patents come 
with the economic benefit of attracting more funding across funding types. The positive and 
significant effect is in line with previous research, especially regarding patents’ effect on 
venture capital funding. Zhou et al. (2016) also find that filing at least one patent application 
before first-round funding has a positive and significant effect on the amount of venture capital 
raised.  
The Capital dummy variable is positive in sign and significant at a 10% level. This result 
suggests that being located in Stockholm has a positive effect on startup funding. In our 
opinion, it seems reasonable to argue that startups located in Stockholm benefit from spillover 
effects from successful startups. The variables NumInvestors and ln(NumEmployees) are 
commented on at the end of this section.  
 




Table 5: Filing a patent application before the first funding round 
The ordinary least squares regressions estimate the effect of filing a patent application on 
the first-round funding amount a startup receives. Our main independent variable of interest 
PatentApp is a dummy, equal to 1 if the startup filed at least one patent application before 
the first funding round, and 0 otherwise. Base group for investment year: 2000; base group 
for industry: biotechnology; base group for funding type: VC. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis below the coefficients.11 Statistical significance is reported with *, **, *** 
indicating significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 ln(Funding) 
 (1) (2) 
PatentApp 0.298 0.434* 
 (0.335) (0.252) 
FirmAge  0.014 
  (0.038) 
NumInvestors  0.576*** 
  (0.163) 
Capital  0.574* 
  (0.334) 
ln(NumEmployees)  0.215** 
  (0.105) 
Investment year dummy No Yes 
Industry dummy No Yes 
Funding type dummy No Yes 
Observations 132 132 
R2 0.006 0.704 
 
Table 6, below, shows the results of whether the number of patent applications filed positively 
affects the first-round funding amount a startup receives, i.e., we test Hypothesis 2. Also, this 
regression is performed on the first funding round for the 132 matched startups. In this 
analysis, the main independent variable of interest is NumPatentApp.  
 
11 We perform the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity on the two models (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). For both models, 
the p-value is sufficiently large enough to fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2020). 
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Again, model 1 is the baseline model. The NumPatentApp coefficient is significant at the 1% 
level. The result suggests that the number of patents before the first round of funding 
significantly positively affects the startup funding amount.  
In model 2, we apply all control variables from section 4.2.3. NumPatentApp has a positive 
effect on the first-round funding amount and is significant at the 5% level. A one standard 
deviation increase in NumPatentApp increases the first-round funding a startup receives by 
14.9%12 compared to its mean. The result suggests that if a startup holds more than one 
patentable innovation, it should apply for patents to raise more startup funding. Our results are 
in line with Hoenen et al. (2014), who found that an increase in the number of patents filed 
was positively associated with the higher amounts of venture capital funding. 
Table 6: Number of filed patent applications before the first funding round 
The ordinary least squares regressions estimate the effect of the number of filed patent 
applications on the first-round funding amount a startup receives. Our main independent 
variable of interest NumPatentApp, is the number of filed patent applications before the 
first round of funding. Base group for investment year: 2000; base group for industry: 
biotechnology; base group for funding type: VC. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis 
below the coefficients.13 Statistical significance is reported with *, **, *** indicating 
significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 ln(Funding) 
 (1) (2) 
NumPatentApp 0.237*** 0.142** 
 (0.065) (0.067) 
FirmAge  0.004 
  (0.038) 
NumInvestors  0.542*** 
  (0.163) 
Capital  0.528 
  (0.331) 
ln(NumEmployees)  0.204* 
  (0.105) 
 
12 NumPatentApp coefficient = 0.142. Standard deviation of NumPatentApp variable = 1.880. Mean value of the dependent 
variable Funding = 5.976. Calculations: (0.142*1.880) / ln(5.976) = 0.149 
13 As in Table 5, we perform the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). Applying a significance 
level of 10%, we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for model (1). Because of that, we report heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors (White, 1980) for this model. 
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Investment year dummy No Yes 
Industry dummy No Yes 
Funding type dummy No Yes 
Observations 132 132 
R2 0.054 0.709 
 
In both Table 5 and Table 6, the variable NumInvestors positively affects first-round funding 
and is significant at the 1% level. The NumInvestors variable tells us that the more investors 
participating in the first round, the more funding the startup will raise, holding other factors 
fixed. Additionally, from Table 5 and Table 6, we see that the variable ln(NumEmployees) 
positively affects the first-round funding a startup receives, and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level and 10% level, respectively. The variable ln(NumEmployees) is a measure of firm 
size, and from our results, we can see that sizeable startups attract more in first-round funding, 
holding other factors fixed. 
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6. Discussion 
The analyses demonstrate a positive correlation between patent applications and startup 
funding for Swedish startups. In line with our first hypothesis, the effect of having filed at least 
one patent application before the first round of startup funding increases the amount by 54.3%. 
The result, in line with the signaling theory of Spence (1973), suggests that the IP-right 
communicates valuable information regarding startup characteristics to investors that can be 
challenging to identify.  
Even though the literature on patents with regard to startup funding across funding types is 
scarce, our findings align with previous empirical findings. Previous research provides 
evidence that patenting activity assist startups in attracting venture capital funding and thus 
increases the funds raised (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2009; Conti et 
al., 2013; Farre-Mensa et al., 2020; Mann & Sager, 2007; Zhou et al., 2016). Our analysis 
provides a similar result; however, we find that the same is true for Swedish startups across 
funding types. 
From the startup’s perspective, by applying for a patent and thereby reliably communicating 
its qualities, startups gain an advantage to raise more considerable amounts of funding in their 
first funding round. More capital provides opportunities to achieving certain milestones, a 
greater probability of successful development, and ultimately startup survival.  
Especially in the case of Swedish startups, these findings are highly relevant. Due to the nature 
of the debt issuance system in Sweden, the person in charge of a company that goes bankrupt 
is held personally accountable. He or she is at risk of being haunted by bad credit ratings for 
the rest of their life (Knowledge@Wharton, 2015). This constraints people as they become 
more risk-averse and less willing to take out loans and eventually to found startups. Our results 
imply that by applying for patents, the startup has an excellent opportunity to benefit from 
equity investments and thus can avoid taking on expensive debt that might go at the expense 
of the entrepreneur’s personal finance if the startup fails.  Additionally, with this in mind, our 
results suggest that entrepreneurship activity in Sweden can stay at a high level, as 
entrepreneurs can stay somewhat risk-loving.  
From an investor’s perspective, our results suggest that patents increase the valuation estimates 
of a startup, making investors willing to provide more funding in the first round. This is in line 
 33 
with previous findings in that patent activity seems to increase venture capitalists’ estimates 
of startup value (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008), especially in early financing rounds (Hsu & Ziedonis, 
2013), and thus increases the amounts of venture capital funding.  
However, our results contradict the claims of Conti et al. (2013) and Sudek (2007). Our 
analysis suggests that patent applications constitute an adequate signal for venture capitalists 
as well as other types of funding, such as angels. The contradicting result might be due to the 
country in question. It might be that patents are not evaluated to be a valuable signal of 
desirable startup characteristics in the US but are in Sweden. Since Sweden has a lot of startup 
activity, patent applications might be an instrument to differentiate low-quality startups from 
high-quality startups without much effort. However, another reason for the contradicting 
results might be that the various investors in our sample consider patents valuable, while on a 
general basis, at least angels do not consider the IP-right important.  
Nevertheless, going through with the application process is a cost-benefit analysis. Startups 
should only go through with the application as long as the benefit, i.e., the amount of funding, 
outweighs the cost of applying. As long as the startup has an invention that can be patented, 
and the startup believes the quality of their invention is high, or prospects are significant, our 
results indicate that startups will benefit significantly from applying for a patent before turning 
to investors for funding.  
Our second analysis addresses whether the patent application stock has a positive effect on 
first-round startup funding and supports our second hypothesis. The results from Table 6, after 
some minor calculations, suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the number of patent 
applications is associated with an increase in first-round funding of 14.9%, compared to its 
mean. This result suggests that investors provide larger funding amounts when innovation 
productivity is high.   
The analysis complements previous findings, which provide evidence that the patent 
applications count positively significantly affects venture capital funding amounts (Baum & 
Silverman, 2004; Hoenen et al., 2014). On the contrary, our results indicate that the same is 
true across funding types for Swedish startups.  
In other words, the more patents a startup applies for signals, among other things, innovative 
activity, making investors better informed about the startup and providing more funding in the 
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first round. Thus, one can argue that increasing the application stock before seeking external 
funding increases the probability of startup survival.  
Our results suggest that investors value innovative activity, among other things, in startups, as 
patents assist startups in increasing the amount raised in the first funding round. However, it 
might be that investors do not necessarily value the innovation activity by itself, but rather the 
right patents give to exclude competitors and thus secure larger profits in the future.  
Overall, our findings suggest that patent applications are associated with higher first-round 
funding across funding types for Swedish startups. The size of the economic impact of patents 
in both analyses is somewhat surprising. It is similar to the ones reported for venture capital 
funding amounts in the research mentioned above. The similarity in size is interesting since 
venture capitalists rarely make one-time upfront investments but rather stage their investment 
amounts (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). Therefore, one could argue that the size of economic 
impact should be larger across funding types since some startup investors do not stage their 
investments. On the other hand, the similarity in effect sizes might confirm that patents serve 




7. Limitations and Further Research 
We acknowledge that our thesis is subject to some limitations, especially regarding our data 
collection. This section describes these limitations. Additionally, we provide suggestions for 
further research.  
7.1 Limitations 
First and foremost, our sample of startups is dated approximately 30 years back in time. One 
can thereby argue that some of the companies in our sample can no longer be considered a 
startup. Even though there is no clear cut on when a company ceases to be in the startup phase, 
the firm size and age indicate that some might have developed past this stage. Some of the 
startups in our sample have grown so large and “old” that they might not be considered a 
startup.  
Our sample of startups was founded from and before 2007 and limits us regarding data on 
control variables to implement in our analysis. Crunchbase was founded in 2007, and even 
though we consider the data reliable, as it comes from Crunchbase’s venture partners, we have 
not been able to extract a desirable amount of startup and investor characteristics. Thus, one 
cannot rule out the possibility that our results can be explained by other financing drivers that 
have not been considered due to unavailable data.  
Even though the covariates used as matching criteria in the PSM should provide us with 
startups with similar pre-treatment characteristics, this is not the case for all startups. It might 
be that our sample of 293 startups is not sufficiently large for the PSM model to find perfect 
matches based on the three covariates. However, as each startup is unique in one way or 
another, the probability of finding two perfectly equal startups is very challenging. Thus, our 
somewhat poor matching results might cause a limitation.    
7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
To correct for the limitations provided by this thesis, as a suggestion for further research, we 
propose applying a dataset of newly founded startups in Sweden. It is reasonable to believe 
that the information on startup and investment characteristics will be both available and up to 
date, supplying additional controls that can affect the funding amount.  
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Further, a qualitative study of our hypotheses, including both startups and investors, would be 
interesting to see whether the empirical results align with the qualitative. Moreover, a deeper 
understanding of what drives the economic impact of patents might be discovered.  
Additionally, during our work, we have discovered that in Sweden, trademarks are filed more 
frequently compared to patents (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2021). Thus, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether trademarks provide even more significant startup 





Throughout this thesis, we have examined whether patents positively affect Swedish startups 
seeking startup funding. We try to answer whether having filed at least one patent application 
before the first funding round increases the amount of funding a startup receives. Additionally, 
we try to answer whether the amount of startup funding also increases with the number of filed 
patent applications. Our empirical analyses suggest that the amount of first-round funding for 
Swedish startups increases if the startup have filed at least one patent application, in line with 
Hypothesis 1. Additionally, the number of filed patent applications before funding also 
positively affects the first-round funding, supporting Hypothesis 2. Thus, our findings imply 
that patents constitute an effective signal that reduces information asymmetries and assists 
startups in attracting startup funding.  
There is a common understanding that patenting startups are more likely to be successful, both 
in the literature and public space. A possible explanation is that patents are publicly available 
documents that reduce information asymmetries regarding startup characteristics challenging 
to assess. Thus, one can argue that patents serve the purpose of a signal. 
Previous research has investigated whether patenting activity attracts higher amounts of 
venture capital funding, with great success. Most studies find a positive association of patents 
regarding the probability of attracting financing and the amounts of funds raised. The few 
studies that take into account other types of funding, such as angels, are contradicting. We 
were motivated by this gap in the literature; as to our knowledge, no studies have ever been 
conducted across funding types nor in a Nordic country in isolation.  
Investigating a sample of 132 startups in Sweden, the results from our analyses indicate that 
besides legal protection, patents serve a signaling purpose that attracts investors across funding 
types. These results can have significant implications for upcoming entrepreneurs in Sweden. 
Thus, startups with patentable inventions should go through with the application process to 
attract external investors and thus increase the probability of future success.  
Our results suggest that patents provide startups with economic benefits in terms of increased 
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Appendix A: Definition of Funding Types 
Here we provide a description of the various funding types found in our sample, based on the 
explanations in the Glossary of Funding Types, by (Crunchbase Inc, n.d.-b).  
We have pooled some funding types into the VC category. The funding types within this 
category includes Seed funding, Series A-G, and Venture – series unknown. The amount 
raised varies from 10k-20M USD in a seed round to 10M+ USD in later rounds, such as series 
C-G. However, there is no limit on how much funding a startup can raise in each round, these 
are just approximations of what is usually raised (Crunchbase Inc, n.d.-b).  
The remaining funding types in our sample is angel, corporate round, grant and private equity. 
Angel rounds is typically one of the first rounds a startup receives, and the amount is not of 
significant size. In a Corporate Round, there is a company acting as a venture capitalist, 
investing in the startup. Grant funding is characterized by investors donating capital, without 
getting anything in return, such as equity stakes. Finally, Private Equity is provided to more 
mature startups and usually amounts to approximately 50M USD (Crunchbase Inc, n.d.-b).   
Appendix B: Propensity Score Matching 
B1 Standardized mean difference (SMD) 
Down below is the formula for calculating the SMD for binary variables. ?̂?" is the 
occurrence of the binary variable in the treatment group, and  ?̂?# is the occurrence of the 




6[?̂?"	(1 −	 ?̂?") +	 ?̂?#	(1 − ?̂?#)]/2
 
(3) 
Appendix C: Econometric Model 
When applying a multiple linear regression model, one tries to estimate the linear relationship 
between a dependent and multiple independent variables. The relationship is estimated 
through an ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The method aims to reduce the sum of 
squares in the distance from the true value and the estimates of the dependent variable, as 
much as possible, and thus provide an unbiased estimate of the population (Wooldridge, 2020). 
For the OLS to be the best linear unbiased estimators, five Gauss-Markov assumptions need 
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to hold. One additional assumption should be in place for the estimators to also be efficient, 
as explained in Wooldridge (2020):  
1. The parameters of the population must be linear (Wooldridge, 2020):  
 𝑦	 = 	𝛽! +	𝛽"𝑥" +		𝛽#𝑥# +	…+ 𝛽%𝑥% + 𝑢 (4) 
2. The data applied in the model is a random sample of n observations from the population 
(Wooldridge, 2020):  
 𝑦 = 	𝛽! +	𝛽"𝑥" +		𝛽#𝑥# +	…+ 𝛽%𝑥% + 𝑢, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 (5) 
3. Both in the sample and the population, there must be variation in the values of the 
independent variables. Additionally, the independent variables cannot be perfectly 
correlated (Wooldridge, 2020). 
4. Given any values of the independent variables, the value of the expression for 
unobservable factors that affects y, the error term u, is expected to be 0 (Wooldridge, 
2020):  
 𝐸(𝑢|𝑥", 𝑥#, … , 𝑥%) = 0 (6) 
5. Homoskedasticity, i.e., conditional on any value of the independent variables, the error 
term u has the same variance. In case of violation, there is heteroskedasticity in the u 
term (Wooldridge, 2020): 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥", 𝑥#, … , 𝑥%) = 	𝜎#	 (7) 
6. Normality, meaning the error term u of the population is identical and independent 
with a mean of 0 and variance of 𝜎# (Wooldridge, 2020): 
 𝑢	~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎#) (8) 
Under assumptions 1-6 the OLS estimators are the best linear unbiased and efficient estimators 
(Wooldridge, 2020).   
C1 Check for multicollinearity 
In order to check for multicollinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the 
main independent variables of interest and some of the control variables that are used in the 
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two multiple regression models from section 5. As a rule of thumb, a VIF below 5 for a variable 
will not cause multicollinearity issues (Buteikis, 2020). From tables 7 and 8, we can see that 
we do not suffer from multicollinearity problems for these variables. However, the funding 
type dummy Angel and investment year dummy 2012 give us a multicollinearity issue. There 
is only one observation for each, and they appear simultaneously; therefore, they explain each 
other perfectly. We do not find this to be a problem as we do not observe multicollinearity 
issues among our main independent variables of interest (Frost, n.d.). 
Table 7: Check for multicollinearity 
Variables VIF Below 5 
PatentApp 1.284 Yes 
FirmAge 4.483 Yes 
NumInvestors 1.929 Yes 
Capital 1.471 Yes 
ln(NumEmployees) 1.561 Yes 
 
Table 8: Check for multicollinearity 
Variables VIF Below 5 
NumPatentApp 1.308 Yes 
FirmAge 4.565 Yes 
NumInvestors 1.959 Yes 
Capital 1.466 Yes 
ln(NumEmployees) 1.572 Yes 
 
C2 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
Table 9 shows the results from the Breusch-Pagan test for the models in Table 5, while Table 
10 shows the same test for the models in Table 6. Applying a significance level of 10%, we 
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for model 1 in Table 6. For the other models, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis. A chi-square distribution with k degrees of freedom is 
used to obtain the p-values (Wooldridge, 2020). 
Table 9: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
Models LM-statistic df p-value 
M1 0.11915 1 0.73 
M2 34.515 43 0.8186 
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Table 10: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity  
Models LM-statistic df p-value 
M1 2.9747 1 0.08458 
M2 37.563 43 0.7055 
 
Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics of Full Sample  
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of full sample (293 startups) 
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max 
Funding 293 5.886 13.272 2.084 0.005 156.864 
NumEmployees 293 54.635 84.109 31 1 376 
NumInvestors 293 1.464 0.813 1 1 5 
FirmAge 293 9.223 6.494 8.100 0.000 28.800 
Capital 293 0.375 0.485 0 0 1 
 
Funding Type N Mean     
   Angel 7 0.024     
   Convertible Note 3 0.01     
   Corporate Round 3 0.01     
   Debt Financing 1 0.003     
   Equity Crowdfunding 4 0.014     
   Grant 38 0.13     
   Pre-Seed 1 0.003     
   Private Equity 5 0.017     
   Secondary Market 2 0.007     
   VC 229 0.782     
       
Industry N Mean     
   Administrative Services 4 0.014     
   Advertising 8 0.027     
   Agriculture and Farming 2 0.007     
   Apps 6 0.02     
   Artificial Intelligence 5 0.017     
   Biotechnology 40 0.137     
   Clothing and Apparel 3 0.01     
   Commerce and Shopping 17 0.058     
   Community and Lifestyle 3 0.01     
   Consumer Electronics 25 0.085     
   Consumer Goods 1 0.003     
   Content and Publishing 9 0.031     
   Data and Analytics 12 0.041     
   Design 5 0.017     
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   Education 3 0.01     
   Energy 12 0.041     
   Financial Services 7 0.024     
   Food and Beverage 4 0.014     
   Gaming 5 0.017     
   Hardware 28 0.096     
   Health Care 15 0.051     
   Information Technology 29 0.099     
   Internet Services 4 0.014     
   Manufacturing 16 0.055     
   Media and Entertainment 6 0.02     
   Mobile 1 0.003     
   Other 7 0.024     
   Professional Services 5 0.017     
   Sales and Marketing 1 0.003     
   Science and Engineering 1 0.003     
   Software 6 0.02     
   Sports 1 0.003     
   Sustainability 1 0.003     
   Transportation 1 0.003     
       
Investment Year N Mean     
   1999 1 0.003     
   2000 7 0.024     
   2001 4 0.014     
   2002 2 0.007     
   2003 7 0.024     
   2004 3 0.01     
   2005 17 0.058     
   2006 31 0.106     
   2007 22 0.075     
   2008 26 0.089     
   2009 9 0.031     
   2010 15 0.051     
   2011 16 0.055     
   2012 3 0.01     
   2013 11 0.038     
   2014 14 0.048     
   2015 18 0.061     
   2016 29 0.099     
   2017 24 0.082     
   2018 12 0.041     
   2019 17 0.058     
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   2020 4 0.014     
   202114 1 0.003     
       
Founded Year N Mean     
   1990 2 0.007     
   1991 5 0.017     
   1992 5 0.017     
   1993 2 0.007     
   1994 4 0.014     
   1995 3 0.01     
   1996 5 0.017     
   1997 5 0.017     
   1998 15 0.051     
   1999 17 0.058     
   2000 26 0.089     
   2001 27 0.092     
   2002 15 0.051     
   2003 26 0.089     
   2004 29 0.099     
   2005 31 0.106     
   2006 40 0.137     






14 Inflation rate for 2020 was used to adjust the monetary value back to 2010. 
